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Monopoly bundling in cyberspace: 
how many products does 
Microsoft sell? 
BY ALAN J. MEESE* 
I. Introduction 
65 
Microsoft has required firms that purchase its operating system to 
take other software from it as well. 1 More precisely, Microsoft 
requires firms that manufacture personal computers (original 
equipment manufacturers or OEMs) to purchase Internet Explorer 
(!E)-Microsoft's Internet browser-if they desire a license to 
"pre-load" the company's Windows operating system (OS) on per-
* Associate Professor of Law, William and Mary School of Law. 
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Conversations with Peter Alces and Trotter Hardy were 
useful in preparing this article. Lawrence Lessig provided helpful com-
ments on earlier drafts. 
This article refers throughout to Microsoft's "bundle" of Windows 
and Internet Explorer. Choice of this or similar terminology, of course, is 
not meant to evince any preconception that the two items are separate 
products for the purpose of tying doctrine. 
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sonal computers (PCs) before they are sold to consumers.2 At one 
time, this requirement was technological in nature. Microsoft sup-
plied Windows 95 and Internet Explorer 3.0 on the same master 
disk, and the former would not function unless the latter was also 
installed.3 Moreover, once IE was installed, deletion of it would 
disable the operating system.4 Subsequently, the requirement 
became contractual in nature, as Microsoft required OEMs to pur-
chase IE 4.0, which was supplied separately, as a condition of 
licensing Windows 95.5 
More recently, the requirement has again become technologi-
cal, as Microsoft has released a new version of its operating sys-
tem, Windows 98. Installation of Windows 98 necessarily entails 
installation of Internet Explorer 4.0, and deletion of the software 
code that performs the browser function will, according to 
Microsoft, degrade the operating system.6 Moreover, once OEMs 
2 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 147 F.3d 935, 940-41 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998). United States v. Microsoft Corp., 1998-2 Trade Cas.1]72,261, 
pp. 82,671-72 (D. D.C. 1998). 
Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41. 
4 /d. 
s This contractual requirement took alternate forms. Initially, 
Microsoft distributed IE 4.0 on a separate CD ROM, and amended its 
Windows 95 license agreements to require OEMs to ship the CD with 
personal computers. Soon thereafter, the agreements were again 
amended, only this time to require OEMs to install IE 4.0 before ship-
ment. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41; United States v. Microsoft, 980 
F. Supp. 537, 544 (D.D.C. 1997). 
6 See Microsoft Corporation's Memorandum in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment 32, No. 98-1232 (D. D.C. August 10, 
1998). This document appears at <www .microsoft.com/presspass/doj/8-
10summjf.htm>. Citations herein are to that document. In a declaration 
filed under seal, Edward W. Felten, a computer scientist retained by the 
United States, purportedly describes how to remove browser functionality 
from the operating system without damaging the latter. See Microsoft, 
1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,673 n.11 (describing declaration's assertions to 
this effect). It is not clear, however, that the procedure described by the 
government actually removes the browser or, instead, simply denies the 
user access to it. !d. See also notes 166-68 infra and accompanying text. 
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have purchased Windows 98/IE, they must insure that it is readily 
available to consumers.7 For example, contracts between Microsoft 
and aEMs prevent the manufacturers from removing the IE icon 
from the screen that consumers encounter when they boot up their 
PCs for the first time.8 Further, while OEMs remain free to pur-
chase and install competing browsers, they must not give such 
browsers greater prominence on the computer desktop than they 
give to IE.9 Thus, even if OEMs believe that, say, Netscape's 
browser is superior to Microsoft's, they must purchase the latter 
and make it readily available to consumers. 
The government has not taken kindly to either bundle. In the 
fall of 1997 the Department of Justice challenged the Windows 
95/IE combination, arguing that it offended a 1994 consent decree 
prohibiting Microsoft from licensing its Windows OS on the con-
dition that purchasers take other application software as well. 10 
7 See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,673-74 (referring to 
Microsoft's contractual restriction on "unbundling" the browser from the 
operating system). 
s See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,677, 82,673-74. Removal 
of the icon, it should be noted, does not delete or otherwise affect the 
software code that provides browser functionality. See Microsoft's Mem-
orandum in Support of Summary Judgment, supra note 6, at 32-34. This 
was also the case with Microsoft's combination of Windows 95 and IE 
3.0 and 4.0. Moreover, while the Windows 95/IE bundles contained an 
"add/remove" utility, the Windows 98/IE bundle has no such utility. At 
any rate, it appears that "removal" of IE does not, in fact, delete the soft-
ware code that constitutes the application, but instead disables it until 
recalled. See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 941 ("It appears to be undisputed that 
[removing the icon and running 'add/remove'] do not remove the IE soft-
ware code, which indeed continues to play a role in providing non-
browser functionality."). 
9 Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,677 (noting that contractual 
restrictions prevent OEMs from "creat[ing] icons or folders larger than 
those placed by Microsoft"). 
10 See Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at passim (entertaining government's 
petition for civil contempt and preliminary injunction); United States v. 
Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (approving decree); 59 
Fed. Reg. 59,426 (Nov. 17, 1994) (reproducing decree). 
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A district court agreed, and enjoined Microsoft from requiring 
OEMs to purchase and install Internet Explorer.11 In May of 1998, 
the government filed a separate suit under the Sherman Act alleg-
ing that Microsoft's integration of Windows 98 with Internet 
Explorer, as well as its contractual prohibition on OEMs interfer-
ing with access to the browser, constitute an illegal tying arrange-
ment.12 
On the surface, the government appears to have an easy case, 
at least in the Sherman Act litigation. Microsoft seems to have 
market power-a dominant share of the OS market, however 
defined. 13 Moreover, there appears to be a "separate demand" for 
OSs and browsers, with the result that the items are deemed dis-
tinct products. 14 Under current law, such an arrangement is unlaw-
II See Microsoft, 980 F. Supp. at 543-44. More precisely, the court 
enjoined Microsoft from requiring OEMs to purchase and install IE 4.0, 
which Microsoft shipped to OEMs on a separate disk. See note 5, supra. 
The court did not, however, purport to require OEMs to remove any soft-
ware code that had already been installed. See 980 F. Supp. at 544, n.8. 
See also Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41. 
12 See Complaint in United States of America v. Microsoft Corpora-
tion, '1]'1]17-23 (May 18, 1998). The government, it should be noted, 
pressed several other claims including, for instance, claims that various 
contracts between Microsoft and Internet access providers violated § 1 of 
the Sherman Act. This article focuses only on the tying claim. 
13 The government has asserted that Microsoft possesses a monopoly 
share of a market consisting of "operating systems for Intel-compatible 
personal computers." See Memorandum of the United States in Support 
of Motion for Preliminary Injunction in United States v. Microsoft Cor-
poration, 15-18 (May 18, 1998); see also Declaration of David Sibley, 
filed in support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction, '11'117-8, 14 (sup-
porting this definition and asserting that Microsoft possesses a 93% share 
of the market so-defined). Moreover, the government has asserted that, 
even if the market were defined more broadly, to include all PC operating 
systems, Microsoft would still possess a monopoly share. See id. at '1114, 
n.20. 
14 See Jefferson Parish Hospital Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 
19-22 ( 1984) (articulating "separate demand" test for determining 
whether two items are separate products). 
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ful per se, without further inquiry into its anticompetitive effects 
or any offsetting benefits.JS 
Still, just a few months ago, the D.C. Circuit suggested a quite 
different result, namely, that such bundling is lawful, without 
regard to the arrangement's possible anticompetitive effects. 
Interpreting the 1994 consent decree, the court suggested that 
Microsoft's bundles of Windows 95 and IE 3.0 and 4.0 did not 
offend the decree but instead fell within its explicit exception for 
"integrated products."16 The combination of browser and OS, the 
court said, appeared to produce benefits not available if, for 
instance, Windows 95 were combined with Netscape's browser.J7 
According to the court, judges are not competent to balance these 
benefits against any anticompetitive effects that might result from 
the combination, as such balancing would essentially require 
courts to second-guess product design decisions. 18 A "plausible 
claim" that integration of two items produced benefits, the court 
said, would establish that Windows 95 and Internet Explorer were 
not simply "bolted together" for the purpose of injuring competi-
tion, but were instead different functions of an innovative product 
beneficial to consumers. 19 While the court remanded the case to 
the district court for a determination whether the combination did, 
in fact, produce such benefits, it signaled clearly its own belief 
that such benefits were present.20 
It did not matter to the D.C. Circuit that Microsoft distributed 
IE 4.0 on a separate disk and that OEMs, therefore, could them-
1s See Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451, 
461-62 (1992); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-18. 
16 Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 945-53. 
17 /d. at 950-51. 
18 /d. at 950, n.l3 ("the limited competence of courts to evaluate 
high-tech product designs and the high cost of error should make them 
wary of second guessing the claimed benefits of a particular design deci-
sion"). 
•
9 /d. at 949-51 and n.12. 
20 /d. at 95 I, n. 15; id. at 952-53 (expressing "tentative" view that 
Windows 95/IE bundle was a "genuine" integration). 
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selves create the very same benefits by choosing to purchase and 
combine the items. Software, the court said, was sufficiently 
"plastic" that it could always be divided into constituent parts. 
The mere feasibility of such division did not negate the showing 
that combination produced benefits and thus could not transform 
what was otherwise a single product into two.zi 
In so holding, the court claimed that it was merely interpreting 
the 1994 consent decree, and not determining whether the bundle 
before it was an illegal tie under the Sherman Act.22 Still, the 
court asserted that its reading of the decree was "consistent with 
tying law," and it invoked tying precedents and scholarly analysis 
of tying doctrine to buttress its decision.23 It was inevitable, then, 
that the court's reasoning would "spill over" into the parallel liti-
gation under the Sherman Act. Indeed, shortly after the D.C. Cir-
cuit issued its opinion, Microsoft moved for summary judgment in 
the Sherman Act suit, relying heavily upon the D.C. Circuit's 
opinion to argue that the Windows 98/IE bundle was a single 
product for tying purposes.24 While the district court denied the 
motion, it grudgingly agreed with Microsoft that the D.C. Cir-
cuit's "plausible benefits" test supplied the appropriate standard 
under the Sherman Act. zs 
21 /d. at 951-52. See also notes 106-10, infra and accompanying 
text. 
22 Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 n.14 ("The antitrust question is of 
course distinct. The parties agree that the consent decree does not bar a 
challenge under the Sherman Act."). 
23 Id. at 950; see also id. at 949-53. 
24 Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 
20-22, 27-34. 
25 Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,674-75 (concluding that ques-
tion was whether there is a " 'plausible claim' that integration 'brings 
some advantages.' "), quoting Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950; Microsoft, 
1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,676-77 (finding factual dispute regarding 
whether combination actually produced benefits and whether Microsoft 
had simply "bolted" two items together). 
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Ultimately, it seems the D.C. Circuit will have to decide 
explicitly which standard-"separate demand" or "plausible bene-
fits"-governs the question whether Windows 98 and Internet 
Explorer constitute separate products for the purpose of tying 
analysis. Moreover, the choice between these competing standards 
will likely be outcome determinative. There is certainly a "sepa-
rate demand" for browsers and operating systems: at least some of 
Microsoft's competitors in the operating system market offer their 
products in unbundled form.26 Conversely, it seems Microsoft will 
likely be able to demonstrate at least some plausible benefits pro-
duced by the Windows 98/IE bundle. Ironically, however, neither 
outcome will rest upon any actual inquiry into the net competitive 
effects of the arrangement. A determination that two products are 
present will evoke the harsh rule of per se illegality; a holding 
that the arrangement is an integrated or single product will end 
the tying inquiry altogether. 
The all or nothing character of each of these alternatives high-
lights tying law's propensity to treat efficiencies in an inconsistent 
and irrational manner, a propensity exacerbated by the single 
product test. A product of the applied price theory tradition of 
industrial organization, the hornbook law of tying, including the 
separate demand test for determining whether two items constitute 
distinct products, is unduly biased against certain efficiencies. 
More precisely, the separate demand test recognizes only those 
efficiencies that are realized universally, i.e., by each firm partici-
pating in the relevant market.27 Where the benefits of bundling 
two items are not realized throughout the market, current law 
treats such a bundle as a tie of two distinct products, a tie that is 
unlawful per se if the seller possesses market power.2s Benefits 
that might be realized by only a subset of market participants will 
be evaluated, if at all, pursuant to the unduly strict standards gov-
erning the "justification" of an otherwise per se unlawful tie. 
26 See note 102, infra. 
27 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462-63; Jefferson Parish, 466 
U.S. at 18-22. 
2~ Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9-18. 
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To many, the assertion that tying doctrine is biased will sound 
like old news. After all, scholars have long argued that tying law 
undervalues certain efficiency claims.29 This article, however, 
takes old news one step further. For, while tying doctrine under-
values certain efficiencies, particularly those generated posttrans-
action, it seems to overvalue others. For instance, where 
efficiencies are realized universally, the separate demand test 
declares the arrangement a single product, and therefore not a tie 
at all. Thus, the test immunizes certain bundles without compar-
ing their benefits to any anticompetitive harm they might create. 
Moreover, some lower court precedents treat any innovative bun-
dle that produces technological, cost-based efficiencies as a single 
product, beyond antitrust scrutiny. Like the separate demand test, 
this so-called technological tying doctrine immunizes certain 
arrangements that may, on balance, reduce consumer welfare. This 
immunity, it should be emphasized, applies only when the combi-
nation's benefits are technological in nature. Where, on the other 
hand, the benefits are contractual, i.e., arise after the combination 
leaves the boundaries of the firm, the bundle in question will be 
deemed separate products and subject to the unforgiving standards 
of the per se rule. 
Current law thus deals with different sorts of efficiencies quite 
differently, and there is no apparent justification for such dis-
parate treatment. Against this backdrop, the D.C. Circuit's opin-
ion can be seen as an attempt to impose a more consistent 
approach to efficiencies, at least where innovative bundles are 
concerned. By declaring beneficial bundles to be single products 
even where a separate demand was present, the court followed the 
lead of so-called technological tying doctrine, placing nonuniver-
sal efficiencies on the same plane as those realized throughout the 
market. Further, by recognizing benefits that arose after the soft-
29 See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Eco-
nomics: Farewell to the Chimera of Forcing, 146 U. PA. L. REv. I 
(1997); Benjamin Klein & Lester Saft, The Law and Economics of Fran-
chise Tying Contracts, 28 J. L. EcoN. 345 (1985); Tyler Baker, The 
Supreme Court and the Per Se Tying Rule: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 66 
VA. L. REV. 1235, 1257-61 {1980). 
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ware left Microsoft's boundaries, the court placed contractual 
efficiencies on the same footing as those that are technological in 
origin. In this way, the court carried the separate demand test 
toward its logical conclusion, immunizing innovative bundles on 
a finding that they produced significant benefits. 
Certainly consistency has much to recommend it. Still, even if 
implemented in the tying context, the D.C. Circuit's approach will 
treat innovative bundles differently from others; the separate 
demand test will, after all, still apply where noninnovative bun-
dles are concerned. Moreover, a desire for a consistent approach 
begs one fundamental question, i.e., which consistent approach? 
The standard articulated by the D.C. Circuit was only one possi-
bility. To be sure, such an approach may have merit as a matter of 
second best, given the unduly harsh content of the per se rule. 
Still, an optimal antitrust policy would account for the benefits of 
such bundling the old fashioned way, by balancing them against 
the anticompetitive effects, if any, produced by the arrangement. 
While such an approach may seem foreclosed by the per se rule, 
there is some precedent for balancing these effects by means of a 
"business justification" defense to ties that are purportedly unlaw-
ful per se. 
This is not to say that courts should engage in open-ended bal-
ancing whenever a seller can show that a bundle will produce ben-
efits. Where a bundle is contractual, i.e., can be replicated by 
purchasers, courts should demand some proof of market failure 
before allowing a seller to show that a contractual restraint is jus-
tified. Where, on the other hand, a bundle is truly technological, 
courts should engage in such balancing. 
II. Tying law, efficiencies, and the rise of the 
separate demand test 
Under current law, an agreement will be deemed a per se 
unlawful tie if three conditions are met: (1) the agreement bundles 
two separate products; (2) the seller has market power over one of 
the items included in the bundle; and (3) the bundle involves a not 
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insubstantial amount of interstate commerce.30 Where a firm holds 
a monopoly, then, the inquiry very quickly devolves into one 
question: Is the bundle really made up of separate products, or is 
it instead just one product that, like nearly all products, consists of 
several components? If deemed two products, the arrangement 
will be declared unlawful per se, if one, beyond scrutiny under 
tying doctrine.31 
Current law, then, prevents a monopolist from bundling two 
truly separate products, even if the bundle produces no anticom-
petitive effects or is, on balance, procompetitive.32 That is, after 
all, the plain implication of the per se rule. To be sure, some lower 
courts allow sellers to justify bundles, even if per se unlawfuJ.33 
Other courts, however, have decided that "per se" means what it 
says, and the Supreme Court has never endorsed the assertion of an 
affirmative defense to a tie otherwise deemed per se unlawful.34 
At any rate, even those courts that purportedly allow sellers to 
justify ties usually subject such attempts at justification to the 
strictest of scrutiny. Sellers must show that benefits outweigh any 
anticompetitive effects, and that the bundle is the least restrictive 
30 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461-62; Jefferson Parish, 466 
U.S. at 9-18. 
31 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 20-22. 
32 See id., at 33-35 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (criticizing the per se 
rule against tying on this basis). 
33 See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 833 F.2d 
1342, 1348-51 (9th Cir. 1987) (entertaining business justification 
defense). 
34 See, e.g., Fox Motors, Inc. v. Mazda Distribs., Inc., 806 F.2d 953, 
957-58 (lOth Cir. 1986) (affirmative defenses are not available where tie 
is per se unlawful); Ringtown Wilbert Vault Works v. Schuylkill Mem'l 
Park, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 823, 827 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (same); Jefferson 
Parish, 466 U.S. at 25-26, n.42 ("We have also uniformly rejected ... 
'goodwiii' defenses for tying arrangements ... [and] there is no basis 
for departing from our prior cases here."); Meese, supra note 29, at 21, 
n.74 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent precludes the assertion of 
affirmative defense to "per se" illegal ties). 
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means of achieving any legitimate objectives.3s It is on this sec-
ond requirement that most attempts at justification founder, as 
courts are quick to invoke "less restrictive" alternatives that are 
also significantly less effective at meeting the objective in ques-
tion.36 For instance, a franchisor that requires its franchisees to 
purchase inputs from it as a means of maintaining uniform, high 
quality in the franchise product will be met with the claim that 
quality specifications, or even reliance on franchisees' best judg-
ment, will suffice for this purpose.37 In so doing, courts ignore the 
very rationale of such restrictions, namely, that franchisees may 
lack the requisite information or incentive to choose inputs of suf-
ficient quality, and that specifications are costly to create, monitor 
and enforce.3s Similar undue hostility has always met assertions 
that bundling is necessary to protect the goodwill of a main or 
tying product. 39 
35 Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz A. G., 828 F.2d 1033, 
1040-41 (4th Cir. 1987); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 
50-52 (9th Cir. 1971); cf. Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 474-75. 
36 See generally Meese, supra note 29, at 71-86. 
37 See Metrix Warehouse, Inc., 828 F.2d at 1041 (franchisor could 
protect its goodwill by relying upon specifications or franchisees' judg-
ment); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51-52 (franchisor could protect its 
goodwill by relying upon specifications); Anderson Foreign Motors v. 
New England Toyota, 475 F. Supp. 973, 984-85 (D. Mass. 1979). But 
compare Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1349-51 (affirming jury's finding that 
less restrictive alternatives would not adequately advance franchisor's 
interest in protecting goodwill associated with trademark). 
3S See Alan J. Meese, Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean 
World: The Case of Franchise Tying Contracts, 95 MICH. L. REv. Ill, 
117-22, 149-51 (1996). 
3Y See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84 (asserting that 
Kodak could protect its goodwill by relying on purchasers' judgment); 
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949) (dicta) 
(asserting that seller can protect goodwill of tying product without con-
tractual restraint by relying upon purchasers to choose superior tied prod-
uct); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947) 
(concluding that manufacturer could protect its goodwill by relying upon 
specifications); IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 139-40 (1936) 
(holding that manufacturer could protect its goodwill by relying upon 
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Tying doctrine's hostility toward affirmative defenses insures 
that cases of monopoly bundling will almost always stand or fall 
on the answer to the separate product question. As a result, tying 
law, at least as articulated by the Supreme Court, has for some 
time been overinclusive, voiding any tie of separate products 
obtained by a monopolist, even those ties that were competitively 
neutral or even beneficial.40 Many lower courts, however, tem-
pered the overinclusive character of formal doctrine through 
manipulation of the single product test, folding into the test the 
question whether the bundle in question created significant effi-
ciencies.41 In so doing, courts treated as single products packages 
of items that, as a matter of common sense anyway, looked quite 
distinct. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp. provides a 
prime example of this approach. There, a seller of mechanical 
customers' judgment or, in the alternative, promulgating specifications); 
Judson L. Thompson Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952, 957-58 (1st Cir. 1945) 
(same). See also Meese, supra note 29, at 72-84. 
40 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 33-35 (O'Connor, J. concurring) 
(criticizing tying doctrine on this basis). 
41 See, e.g., Hirsch v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 674 F.2d 1343, 
1347-48 (9th Cir. 1982) (determining whether two items were separate 
products by asking "whether the aggregation serves to facilitate competi-
tion by promoting product quality"); Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 
F.2d 303, 307-11 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding that franchise opportunity and 
lease of franchise premises were a single product because "the challenged 
aggregation is an essential ingredient for the franchise system's formula 
for success"); Kugler v. Aamco Automatic Transmission, 460 F.2d 1214, 
1215-16 (8th Cir. 1972); Dehydrating Process Co. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 
292 F.2d 653, 655-57 (1st Cir. 1961). See also HERBERT HovENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE, 
366 (1994) ("(C]reative courts have manipulated the judicial test so as to 
distinguish efficient from inefficient forced sales."); STEPHEN F. Ross, 
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW, 290 (1992). Several scholars endorsed such 
an approach. Klein & Saft, supra note 29, at 359-61; Baker, supra note 
29, at 1315 (endorsing broad single product inquiry as second-best 
approach given overinclusive nature of the per se rule); Ward S. Bow-
man, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 29 
(1957). See also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 448-49 (1977) (argu-
ing that most efficiency claims can be addressed as part of the single 
product inquiry). 
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unloaders bundled such unloaders with storage silos. The seller 
claimed that, when it had previously sold unloaders separately, for 
use with silos made by others, it received substantial customer 
complaints.42 First Circuit precedent, however, foreclosed any 
assertion that such concerns justified an otherwise illegal tie. 
Evaluating a tie of rivet-setting machines and rivets, the court had 
previously held that purchasers, "are quite capable of judging for 
themselves in an atmosphere of competition whether or not rivets 
of one manufacturer will work in the machines of another," with 
the result that any justification must fail. 43 Nevertheless, the 
Dehydrating Process court relied on the (negative) goodwill con-
sequences of separate sale in holding that unloaders and silos 
were a single product.44 Under this and similar precedents, then, a 
bundle that created significant benefits was, without more, a "sin-
gle product," beyond antitrust scrutiny.4s 
42 Indeed, one half of these purchasers filed refund claims. Dehy-
drating Process Co., 292 F.2d at 655-56. Such complaints occurred, the 
court noted, despite the seller's efforts to inform purchasers that its 
unloaders might not be compatible with silos made by others. See id. at 
656. 
43 See Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co., 150 F.2d at 957-58 (condemn-
ing tie of rivet-setting machines and rivets). See also note 39, supra (col-
lecting Supreme Court authority for the same proposition). The court 
reached this conclusion, it should be noted, despite its finding that "the 
best results are obtained when the machines and rivets of one manufac-
turer are used together, and that if improper rivets are used repairs to the 
machines at the expense of the lessor and interruptions might ensure." 
Judson L. Thompson Mfg. Co., 150 F.2d at 957. 
Dehydrating Process Co., 292 F.2d at 655-57. 
45 For instance, in Principe, the Fourth Circuit found that McDon-
ald's requirement that franchisees lease premises from it was not a tie 
because the trademark and premises were "integral components of the 
business methods being franchised." 631 F.2d at 309. In so holding, the 
court emphasized that McDonald's possessed superior information about 
local real estate markets and was in a better position to take account of 
the effect of certain locations on the franchise system as a whole. See 
Principe, 631 F.2d at 309-10; see also Kugler, 460 F.2d at 1215-16 
(holding that franchise trademark and advertising materials purchased 
from a local agency were not separate products for tying purposes). Cf 
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The Supreme Court put a stop to this creativity, or at least 
tried to, in Jefferson Parish. There the Court rejected the assertion 
that the answer to the single product question should turn on 
whether the bundle in question produces significant benefits.46 
Instead, the Court said, two items should be deemed separate 
products whenever there is sufficient "separate demand" for each 
of the bundled items that a significant number of firms do, in fact, 
offer the items in question separately.47 The existence of such sep-
arate sales, the Court said, would establish that it is efficient to 
offer the items in unbundled form. 48 Lower courts, in turn, relied 
on this new test to find two products where previous tests may 
have found only one.49 
Leading antitrust scholars have endorsed the Jefferson Parish 
approach to the single product question, characterizing this stan-
dard as a process-oriented mechanism for determining whether, in 
Meese, supra note 38, at 132-33 (arguing that, as the sole owner of the 
trademark, the franchisor will have incentive to maximize revenue of the 
franchise system). 
46 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-20. Cf. id. at 40 (O'Connor, J. 
concurring) (arguing that two items should not be deemed separate prod-
ucts "when the economic advantages of joint packaging are substantial"); 
see also Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 
703-04 (7th Cir. 1984) (concluding that Jefferson Parish rejected 
"economies" test for determining whether bundle of two items consti-
tuted a single product). 
47 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21-22; see also Eastman Kodak, 504 
U.S. at 462-63 (applying separate demand test). 
48 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 22-23; see also Eastman Kodak, 504 
U.S. at 462-63 ("[T]he development of the entire high tech service indus-
try is evidence of the efficiency of a separate market for service."). 
49 Compare Faulkner Advertising Associates, Inc. v. Nissan Motor 
Corp., 905 F.2d 769, 773-74 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that franchise 
trademark and advertising services were distinct products under Jefferson 
Parish separate demand test) with Principe, 631 F.2d at 309-10 (trade-
mark and real estate lease are single product) and Kugler, 460 F.2d at 
1215-16 (trademark and advertising services are a single product). See 
also PSI Repair Services, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 814-16 
(6th Cir. 1997) (finding circuit boards and constituent components to be 
single product). 
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fact, the bundling at issue produces significant efficiencies.so Of 
course, the fact that a seller with market power has chosen to bun-
dle two items is little indication of the practice's efficiency. How-
ever, even in those instances in which a firm has a monopoly for 
antitrust purposes, there may be a significant number of other 
firms in the market that have no market power.51 Moreover, even 
if a firm possesses a complete monopoly within its own geo-
graphic market, there may be other geographic markets that are 
quite competitive.52 Where firms with no market power or expec-
tation of obtaining it commonly sell the items in question sepa-
rately, it is said, a presumption is properly established that 
unbundled sale of the items is efficient, and further scrutiny is 
necessary.53 Where, on the other hand, all such firms provide the 
items in question only in a bundle, combination must reflect cost 
savings when compared to separate provision. 54 In such cases, it is 
said tying analysis should cease, as forcing even a monopolist to 
unbundle would be inefficient.ss Indeed, condemnation of a uni-
so See X PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE & HERBERT HovENKAMP, 
ANTITRUST LAW 11111741, 1744, at 196-202, 1745b, c (1995); see also 
Ross, supra note 41, at 287-90. 
51 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 481 (80% share of market 
sufficient to show monopoly); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 
328 U.S. 781, 797 (1944) (market share greater than two-thirds consti-
tutes a monopoly). 
sz See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 111744cl. 
S3 See id. 111744, at 203-04; see also Ross, supra note 41, at 289 
(agreeing with statement in Eastman Kodak that existence of separate 
sales for tied product "is evidence of the efficiencies of a separate mar-
ket''). 
54 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 111744, at 197-98. See also 
HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 360 (arguing that ubiquity of a tying 
arrangement does not establish market power because "if the arrangement 
is efficient, then we would expect it to be ubiquitous"). Cf Rothery Stor-
age & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 
1986) (Bork, J.) (where contract cannot create or enhance market power, 
it likely is designed "to make the conduct of business more effective"). 
ss See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 111744b, c5. 
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versally-adopted bundle would purportedly place a monopolist at 
an unfair competitive disadvantage. 56 
In the real world, of course, the separate demand test for deter-
mining whether two items are distinct products will not identify 
every instance in which bundling produces significant efficien-
cies. While the presence of uniform bundling in a competitive 
market is sufficient to demonstrate that bundling produces signifi-
cant benefits, it is by no means necessary. Instead, bundling may 
substantially reduce the costs faced by some firms but not those 
faced by others; in such cases the separate demand test will never-
theless compel the conclusion that two products are involved.57 
Still, scholars maintain courts can properly account for such 
nonuniversal efficiencies by allowing sellers to assert a business 
justification defense.ss 
III. Tying doctrine, price theory, and the treatment of 
innovative bundles 
A Tying doctrine as applied price theory 
As currently structured tying law takes cognizance of efficien-
cies in two very different ways. Some benefits are captured by the 
separate demand test with its reliance upon the presence or 
absence of bundling by firms with no market power or chance of 
achieving it. When application of this test reveals that benefits are 
present, the bundle in question is treated as a single product, and 
scrutiny ends. Benefits not captured by this test, if they are recog-
nized at all, will only be considered under the hostile standards 
governing the scrutiny of business justifications. 
56 Id. 
57 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-23; AREEDA ET AL., supra note 
50,~ 1744e, at 204. See also notes, 73-84, infra and accompanying text. 
58 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50,~ 1741b, at 180-81; id. 
~ I744e, at 204. See also Ross, supra note 41, at 290, 296-99 (assuming 
that, where separate demand is present, efficiencies can be properly ana-
lyzed via a business justification defense); HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 
369-70 (same). 
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Tying law's uneven approach to different sorts of efficiencies 
is not, it seems, accidental. Instead, this disparate treatment 
reflects what Oliver Williamson has described as the "applied 
price theory" tradition of industrial organization, a tradition that 
has influenced antitrust doctrine for several decades.59 Price the-
ory, and the school of industrial organization that it spawned, pro-
vided a complete paradigm that purported to explain all varieties 
of firm behavior. The assumptions animating the paradigm were 
straightforward. The world consisted of innumerable, fully 
autonomous firms. The boundary between a firm and the mar-
ket-that is, the distinction between what a firm did itself and 
what it left for others-was a function of the firm's own costs and 
those of potential suppliers or distributors. These costs, in tum, 
were determined entirely by technology and reflected in each 
firm's production function.60 So, for instance, in deciding whether 
to produce its own auto bodies or purchase auto bodies from oth-
ers, an automobile manufacturer would compare its own cost of 
production with those of potential suppliers; differences in such 
costs would be a function of economies of scale, economies of 
scope, and the like. 61 
S9 See Oliver Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust. 76 GEo. L. J. 271, 
273 (1987) (describing influence of applied price theory tradition of 
antitrust); OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 
23-26, 365-84 (1985) (same); R. H. CoASE, Industrial Organization: A 
Proposal for Research, in THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAw 57, 58-62 
(1988) (describing limitations of price-theoretic approach to industrial 
organization). See also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory and Vertical 
Restraints: A Misunderstood Relation, 45 UCLA L. REV. 143, 190-92 
(1997) (describing price-theoretic assumptions underlying traditional 
doctrines governing vertical restraints). 
w See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 7-8, 86-89; Oliver Williamson, 
Technology and Transaction Cost Economics, 10 J. EcoN. BEH. & 0RG. 
355, 356 (1988) (contending that, within price-theoretic paradigm, "the 
'natural' boundaries of the firm were thought to be defined by engineer-
ing considerations"); George Stigler, The Division of Labor is Limited By 
the Extent of the Market, 59 J. PoL EcoN. 185, 185 (1951) (economists 
"have generally treated as a (technological?) datum the problem of what 
the firm does-what governs its range of activities or functions"). 
61 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 3. Thus, works of the period 
referred to two-and only two-possible justifications for vertical inte-
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Because the costs of performing any given economic activity 
were solely a function of production technology, the price-theo-
retic paradigm only recognized or contemplated efficiencies of the 
sort that could be realized within a firm, previous to any sale 
transaction. Concomitantly, within this paradigm, once a sale was 
made, and the item in question passed beyond the boundary of the 
firm, any efficiencies attributable to that firm were exhausted. 
Thus, there was nothing to be gained through contractual restric-
tions on the manner in which a purchaser used the item sold or 
performed any functions related to it.62 To be sure, a firm could 
realize (technological) efficiencies by integrating fully into 
another step of the production process; it could not, however, real-
ize similar efficiencies by contract. 63 
gration: (1) reduction in production costs and (2) monopolization or other 
antisocial behavior. See, e.g., DoNALD DEWEY, MoNOPOLY IN EcoNOMICS 
AND LAw 201-02 (1959); Friedrich Kessler & Richard Stern, Competi-
tion, Contract and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1959); 
Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act, 22 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 157, 200 (1954). See also Williamson, supra note 60, at 356 (con-
tending that, aside from engineering considerations, "[o]nly a narrow 
range of price theoretic purposes for reshaping economic organization are 
entertained by this conception of the firm . . . to perfect monopoly, 
evade sales taxes and the like"). 
62 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 371 (concluding that, within 
price-theoretic paradigm, "there was nothing to be gained by introducing 
nonstandard [contractual] terms into market-mediated exchange"); id. at 
23-26; CoASE, supra note 59, at 67. A prime example is found in price 
theory's treatment of exclusive dealing contracts. As described by price 
theorists, the benefits of such arrangements were limited to their propen-
sity to lower the costs of production and distribution. Such arrangements, 
for instance, were thought to assure manufacturers of an outlet for their 
product and insure larger and less frequent deliveries. Because these ben-
efits could be reflected in volume discounts, scholars said dealers would 
choose exclusive purchasing "voluntarily," without contractual require-
ment. See, e.g., JoEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR CoMPETITION: 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST PoLICY 181-87 (1954) ("(l)t is dif-
ficult to see why many of the mutual benefits and socially beneficent 
consequences of exclusive dealing require coercion for their achieve-
ment."); accord, Standard Oil Co., 337 U.S. at 313-14. 
63 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 184-89. Professor Williamson 
cites the brief of the United States in United States v. Arnold Schwinn, 
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Price theory's embrace of a technology-only view of efficien-
cies, it should be noted, depended upon certain critical assump-
tions about the behavior of those who took title to items once they 
passed beyond the seller's boundaries. For instance, it was 
assumed that purchasers had perfect information about items they 
bought, or that sellers could provide them with such information 
costlessly.64 Moreover, it was assumed that purchasers would not 
act opportunistically, that is, would behave so as to maximize the 
joint utility of both parties.6s Given these assumptions, price theo-
rists saw no legitimate need for contractual restraints on the man-
ner in which purchasers made use of the product.66 
388 U.S. 365 (1967), a brief authored by Donald Turner and Richard Pos-
ner. Similar reasoning can be found in WilliamS. Comanor, Vertical Ter-
ritorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1436 (1968). 
64 See Richard N. Langlois, Transaction Costs, Production Costs, 
and the Passage of Time, in CoASEAN EcoNOMics: LAw AND EcoNOMICS 
AND THE NEw INSTITUTIONAL EcoNOMICS 2 (Steven G. Medema ed., 1998) 
("In this kingdom [the price-theoretic paradigm], knowledge remains 
explicitly and freely transmittable, and cognitive limits seldom if ever 
constrain."). 
65 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 7 (noting that price-theoretic 
paradigm assumed that adjudication would prevent opportunism); id. at 
48 (arguing that, in the absence of opportunism, parties could govern 
relationships through "general clause" contracting, requiring each to act 
in a jointly-rational manner); Comanor, supra note 63, at 1430 (asserting 
that "unrestricted market" would provide optimal quantity of pre- and 
postsale services, despite free-rider problem); id at 1433 (same); Lee E. 
Preston, Restricted Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and 
Public Policy Factors, 30 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 506, 511 n.12 (1965). 
Meese, supra note 59, at 190-92 (asserting that traditional approach to 
vertical restraints rested on such an assumption). 
66 Professor Williamson has summarized this milieu as follows: 
The allocation of economic activity as between firms and markets 
was taken as a datum; firms were characterized as production 
functions; markets served as signaling devices; contracting was 
accomplished through an auctioneer; and disputes were disre-
garded because of the presumed efficacy of court adjudication. 
The possibility that subtle economizing purposes are served by 
organizational variety does not arise within-indeed, is effectively 
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The fact that price theory recognized only technological, pre-
transactional efficiencies did not insure that it recognized all such 
efficiencies. The paradigm did more than assume that technology 
was the sole source of efficiencies; it also assumed that all firms 
possessed the same technology and thus faced the same produc-
tion function. 67 This singular focus on (universally possessed) 
beyond the reach of-this orthodox frame work. Correspondingly, 
the prevailing public policy attitude toward unfamiliar or nonstan-
dard business practices during that interval was deep suspicion 
and even hostility. 
WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 7. 
Professor Coase offered a similar summary of the price-theoretic atti-
tude toward contractual restraints. 
[I]f an economist finds something-a business practice of one sort 
or other-that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly 
explanation. And as we are very ignorant in this field, the number 
of ununderstandable practices tends to be rather large, and the 
reliance on a monopoly explanation is frequent. 
CoASE, supra note 59, at 67. 
67 Langlois, supra note 64, at 2-4 ("[T]he 'theory of the firm' of 
price theory . . . begins with identical idealized firms and then builds up 
to the industry by simple addition. . . . Thus does the 'theory of the 
firm' in the modern-day price theory start with firms as production func-
tions, each one identical, and each one transforming homogeneous inputs 
into homogeneous outputs according to given technical 'blueprints' 
known to all."). See also F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 
35 AMER. EcoN. REv. 519, 521-22 (1945) (decrying overreliance by 
economists and others upon "scientific knowledge," to the exclusion of 
more localized, idiosyncratic knowledge). The assumption that firms all 
possess the same production function, of course, was most often associ-
ated explicitly with the perfect competition model. As Professor Hayek 
observed, however, most conditions of the perfect competition model 
"are equally assumed in the discussion of the various 'imperfect' or 
'monopolistic' markets, which throughout assume certain unrealistic 
'perfections.'" See F. A. HAYEK, The Meaning of Competition, in INDIVID-
UALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 94 (1948). See also id. at 97-98 (describing 
assumption of perfect competition model that "a large number of people 
are producing the same commodity and command the same objective 
facilities and opportunities for doing so"); Langlois, supra note 64, at 2 
(noting that Joan Robinson and Edward Chamberlin, who pioneered the 
theory of oligopoly, relied upon price-theoretic models). 
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technology as the sole source of efficiencies precluded recogni-
tion of efficiencies associated with differences in institutional 
structure, personal knowledge, and the Iike.6s In the real world, of 
course, such differences as well as, for that matter, historical acci-
dent, could lead different firms to adopt different technologies, or 
to employ similar technologies in varying ways.69 By ignoring 
these differences in knowledge, structure and history, and thus 
assuming that all firms employed the same technology and faced 
the same costs, price theory missed important sources of pretrans-
actional efficiency. 
The law of tying, and with it the current test for distinguishing 
a bundle from a single product, reflect the price-theoretic 
paradigm. As I have shown elsewhere, the law's attitude toward 
tying distinct products flows readily from price theory's hostility 
toward contracts apparently designed to extend a firm's influence 
beyond its "natural" boundaries.70 This hostility has found expres-
6S See Williamson, supra note 59, at 11-12; Langlois, supra note 64, 
at 2-4. See also HAYEK, supra note 67, at 97-99. 
69 See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 64, at II ("Standard price theory 
partakes of the epistemology of old spy movies, in which complete 
knowledge of how to build and launch an ICBM could somehow be tran-
scribed onto a microdot and hidden under a postage stamp. . . . In the 
world of tacit knowledge, [however,] having the same blueprints as one's 
competitors is unlikely to translate into having the same costs of produc-
tion."); HAYEK, supra note 67, at IOI-02 ("[I]n conditions of real life the 
position even of any two producers is hardly ever the same. . . . At any 
given moment the equipment of a particular firm is always largely deter-
mined by historical accident, and the problem is that it should make the 
best use of the given equipment (including the acquired capacities of the 
members of its staff) and not what it should do if it were given infinite 
time to adjust itself to constant conditions."); HAYEK, supra note 67, at 
523 ("How easy is it for an inefficient manager to dissipate the differen-
tials on which profitability rests and that it is possible, with the same 
technical facilities, to produce with a great variety of costs are among 
commonplaces of business experience that do not seem to be equally 
familiar in the study of the economist."). 
70 Meese, supra note 29. at 50-54. Cf Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 
21-22 (stating that the single product test must be framed so as to iden-
tify those instances in which sellers "have foreclosed competition on the 
merits in a product market distinct from the market for the tying item"). 
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sion not merely in the ease with which the per se rule is invoked, 
but also, of course, in the poor treatment accorded attempts at 
business justifications. Witness, for instance, the many statements 
by economists and others that purchasers are perfectly capable of 
deciding for themselves whether to purchase the items a seller 
wishes to bundle, even in those instances in which a seller can 
demonstrate that such bundling will protect its goodwill. 71 This 
assumption of course, is reflected in tying law's conclusion that 
reliance upon the purchaser's judgment, perhaps informed by 
specifications, is an effective, less restrictive alternative that 
defeats the assertion of a business justification defense. 72 
Of course, there is nothing to justify unless the law treats the 
bundled items as separate products. Like tying law generally, 
however, the separate demand test rests upon unrealistic assump-
tions associated with the price-theoretic paradigm. As noted ear-
lier, this test treats separate sale of two items as efficient whenever 
some firms in the relevant market engage in such unbundling.73 
The necessary implication of such a finding, of course, is that the 
bundling before the court is not designed to minimize costs. This 
71 See, e.g., James M. Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciproc-
ity: An Economic Analysis, 30 L. & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 522, 558-64 (1965); 
Donald F. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the 
Antitrust Laws, 72 HARV. L. REV. 50, 66-67 (1958); Alfred E. Kahn, A 
Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New" Sherman and Clayton Acts, 
63 YALE L.J. 293, 324, n.160 (1954); William B. Lockhart & Howard R. 
Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether 
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. 
L. REv. 913, 946 (1952); Louis B. Schwartz, Potential Impairment of 
Competition-The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of Calif. v. United States, 
98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 27 (1949) ("The efficiency of uniting two products 
in use [should] be judged by the end user."). 
72 See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84; Standard Oil, 337 U.S. 
at 305; International Salt, 332 U.S. at 397-98; IBM, 298 U.S. at 139; 
Metrix Warehouse, 828 F.2d at 1041; Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 
51-52; Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co., 150 F.2d at 957-58. See also 
Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) ("[A]ny 
intrinsic superiority of the 'tied' product would convince freely choosing 
buyers to select it over others, anyway."). 
73 See notes 46-49, supra and accompanying text. 
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result, however, depends upon the (price-theoretic) assumption 
that all firms in the relevant market, including the monopolist, 
share the same production function and thus the same costs as 
those firms that have chosen to unbundle.74 Otherwise, there 
would be no basis for presuming that separate sale by the monop-
olist would be efficient. Efficiencies not realized by all, then, are 
barely recognized. 
Posttransactional efficiencies, it seems, find themselves partic-
ularly hard hit by the separate demand approach. For, unlike pre-
transactional efficiencies, which may in some cases correspond to 
uniform technological laws, posttransactional efficiencies will 
likely be correlated with nonuniform, idiosyncratic factors.7s 
A fast food franchisor, for instance, may find itself with two 
classes of franchisee: those who do business in stable neighbor-
hoods with a significant amount of repeat business, and those who 
do business on turnpikes with mostly one-time patrons. In these 
circumstances, a franchisor might logically decide to protect the 
goodwill associated with its trademark by requiring the second 
class of franchisee to purchase certain inputs only from the fran-
chisor, leaving those franchisees in the first class free to choose 
inputs of their choice.76 Or, a particular franchisor may confine its 
74 Indeed, a leading treatise explicitly assumes that universal 
bundling in one competitive market should establish that bundles in other 
markets are efficient because production costs and quality concerns will 
likely be uniform across geographic markets. See AREEDA ET AL., supra 
note 50, 1]1744cl, at 198-99. See also id. 1]1744c4, at 200 ("That the 
unconcentrated competitors bundle A-B in the very same market as the 
defendant makes it unlikely that the cost, quality, or consumer preference 
implications of the bundling differ among the sellers."). The treatise 
offers no theoretical argument or empirical evidence for these assertions 
that firms that make the same products generally share the same produc-
tion functions. 
1s See WILLIAMSON, supra note 59, at 48. 
76 See Meese, supra note 38, at 119, n.37; WILLIAMSON, supra note 
59, at 48 ("It is not necessary, moreover, that all parties be given to 
opportunism in identical degree. . . . [I]f the propensity to behave 
opportunistically is known to vary among members of the contracting 
population, . . . gains can be realized by expending resources to discrim-
inate among types."). Indeed, some franchisors have gone so far as to 
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locations to areas where repeat business predominates, and thus 
eschew bundling, while a different franchisor that focuses only on 
turnpikes or similar areas with little repeat business might adopt 
bundling throughout its entire system.n 
Each such instance of franchisor bundling could produce sub-
stantial benefits; yet, each will be deemed a tie of separate prod-
ucts under current law. For, under that law, a trademark and good 
or service will only be deemed a single product where the fran-
chise is of a source variety, that is, where the trademark in ques-
tion simply signals that the bundled item was necessarily 
manufactured within the same firm that owns the trademark. 78 If, 
on the other hand, the franchise is of a business format variety, 
the trademark will merely signify that the franchisee is operating 
under the franchisor's guidelines, and not that the franchise prod-
uct originates with the franchisor. Many other firms will likely 
manufacture the bundled item, and the separate demand test will 
require the conclusion that the bundle consists of two distinct 
products.79 Items that technology requires to be produced within 
integrate vertically with respect to those outlets that serve mostly one-
time customers, leaving other outlets independently owned. See Keith K. 
Wollenberg, Note, An Economic Analysis of Tie-In Sales: Reexamining 
the Leverage Theory, 39 STAN. L. REv. 737, 754-55, n.114 (1987) (noting 
that Standard Oil once owned all service stations operating on interstate 
highways, while allowing owner-operated stations in neighborhoods 
where repeat trade was prevalent). 
77 See Klein & Saft, supra note 29, at 348, n.15 (noting that a partic-
ular franchisor "assured high-quality supply by granting franchisees 
fairly large exclusive territories and locating their outlets off the main 
highway"). 
78 See Power Test Petroleum Distributors v. Calcu Gas, 754 F.2d 91, 
96-98 (2d Cir. 1985); Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 704-05; Krehl v. 
Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 664 F.2d 1348 (9th Cir. 1982). 
79 See, e.g., Faulkner Advertising Associates, 905 F.2d at 772-74; 
Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 51-52; William Cohen & Son v. All Ameri-
can Hero, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 201, 205-07 (D. N.J. 1988); Smith v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1314 (W.D. Mo. 1987). The leading academic 
proponent of the separate demand test, it should be noted, has rejected 
any distinction between source and business format franchises, arguing 
that, in either case, courts should deem a bundle that produces significant 
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the firm owning the trademark will be deemed part of a single 
product, those naturally produced outside the firm will be deemed 
distinct. 80 As two scholars have noted, this result is perverse, as 
bundling may well produce more benefits where a business format 
franchise is involved.SI 
To some extent, the current bias against efficiencies not 
acknowledged by the price-theoretic paradigm could be remedied 
by explicitly recognizing the availability of affirmative defenses 
and relaxing the traditionally onerous standards governing their 
assertion. And, indeed, several scholars, including some who sup-
port the current contours of the single product test, have called for 
just such an approach.82 More precisely, these scholars have called 
efficiencies a single product. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '1!1749a2. 
Thus, the treatise approves of the result in Principe, although many fran-
chisors do not, as McDonald's did there, require their franchisees to lease 
real estate from them. See id. 'IJ1749a2, at 256, n.25 (approving Principe). 
The treatise implicitly concedes, then, that the separate demand test does 
not identify all bundles that produce significant benefits. 
so Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 48, n.4 (concluding that Chicken 
Delight trademark and bundled items were separate products because, 
inter alia, "Chicken Delight did not itself manufacture the tied items"). 
Similarly, the manufacturer of a complex machine may believe that some 
purchasers have the correct incentives and expertise to choose their own 
complementary products, but that others are incapable of making such 
choices. See IBM, 298 U.S. at 134 (noting that IBM, which bundled the 
purchase of adding machines and punch cards, allowed the United States 
to purchase cards separately, upon payment of a royalty). If, however, the 
manufacturer should choose to bundle only with respect to the second 
class of customers, the separate demand test will compel a finding that 
the seller has tied two separate products. PSI Corp., 104 F.3d at 816-17 
(describing Honeywell's practice of bundling with respect to some cus-
tomers but not others and concluding that two products were present); 
Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 33 F.3d 194, 214 (3d Cir. 1994) (same). Cf. 
Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 484 (questioning Kodak's claim that 
bundling was necessary to protect its goodwill because the policy was not 
pursued consistently). 
~ 1 Klein & Saft, supra note 29, at 359-61. 
': See, e.g., AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '1!1760e-f; HovENKAMP, 
supra note 41, at 369; Ross, supra note 41, at 296-300. See also Meese, 
supra note 38, at 141-45, 149-52 (taking contours of separate product 
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on courts to treat efficiencies not identified by the separate 
demand test just as courts would treat such efficiencies in the rule 
of reason context.s3 Indeed, as noted earlier, one treatise has 
explicitly argued that the availability of such relaxed scrutiny jus-
tifies the refusal to consider nonuniversal efficiencies at the single 
product stage.84 
Certainly relaxation of the current judicial hostility toward the 
assertion of justifications to bundles would be a positive develop-
ment; indeed, I have argued elsewhere that the prevalence of such 
efficiencies requires repeal of the per se rule.85 Still, such relax-
ation would not eliminate entirely the disparate treatment cur-
rently accorded different sorts of efficiencies. Instead, under such 
a regime, any efficiencies captured by the separate demand test 
would, ipso facto, immunize the bundle from further scrutiny. 
Other efficiencies, however, would have to be weighed against 
any anticompetitive effects produced by the bundle. Moreover, 
even if such efficiencies were to predominate, the bundle would 
nevertheless be condemned if the same (or nearly the same) bene-
fits could be achieved through less restrictive means. 86 
test as a given and advocating relaxation of standards governing affirma-
tive defenses). 
83 See Meese, supra note 82, at 141-45, 149-52; AREEDA ET AL., 
supra note 50, 1]1760e-f; HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 369; Ross, supra 
note 41, at 296-300. 
84 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1741b, at 180-81. See also 
Ross, supra note 41, at 290. 
85 See Meese, supra note 29, at 86-94. 
86 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1760d ("Even where the bene-
fit of the restraint outweighs the harm, society need not suffer that harm 
if the defendant's legitimate objectives can be achieved equally well (or 
nearly so) by an alternative means that restrains competition substantially 
less."); see also VII AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1505, at 385-89 
(describing identical approach in the rule of reason context). This treatise 
recognizes that rule of reason scrutiny would treat efficiencies less favor-
ably than does the single product test it praises and advocates. See 
AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1760c, at 366. On the next page, how-
ever, it asserts that "a tribunal's relative hospitality to efficiency and 
other defenses should be the same whether lack of justification is consid-
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The rationale for such disparate treatment is not immediately 
apparent. According to some, where bundling two items is a uni-
versal practice, forcing a monopolist to unbundle will be ineffi-
cient, i.e., will force the firm to employ more real resources than 
necessary to provide the ultimate good or service in question.s7 
Moreover, because firms with no market power will remain free to 
bundle, forced unbundling will place the monopolist at a competi-
tive disadvantage.ss Each of these arguments, however, depends 
upon the assumption that all firms, including the monopolist, 
share the same production function, i.e., that the monopolist real-
izes the same efficiencies through bundling as do smaller firms. 
If, on the other hand, bundling does not produce the same effi-
ciencies for the monopolist, prohibiting such bundling will have 
no negative effects. 
Let us assume, however, that the presence of universal 
bundling establishes that firms share the same production func-
tion. Even if this is the case, there is still no reason to distinguish 
universal efficiencies from those that are achieved only by certain 
firms, such as the monopolist. For, even in the case of nonuniver-
sal efficiencies, forcing the monopolist to unbundle will be ineffi-
cient, raise the firm's costs and place it at a disadvantage vis a vis 
those firms still allowed to bundle, or firms that can replicate its 
costs without bundling. Relaxation of the price-theoretic assump-
tion that all firms share the same production function, and the 
concomitant recognition that bundling can benefit some but not 
others, calls into question any preference for bundles that are uni-
versally adopted. Consistency would seem to require adjustments 
in tying doctrine designed to take cognizance of efficiencies in a 
more rational manner. 
ered under the one product or the defensive heading." !d. 1!1760c, at 367. 
Both statements, it seems, cannot be correct. 
87 See note 55, supra and accompanying text. 
See note 56, supra and accompanying text. 
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B. Special treatment for innovations 
The shortcomings of the separate demand test are most appar-
ent in rapidly changing markets, where firms are least likely to 
share similar cost structures. Thus, even scholars who otherwise 
support the Jefferson Parish separate demand test have advocated 
a more relaxed approach where the bundle in question can be 
characterized as an innovation. As defined by these scholars, 
"innovation" can take two forms. First, a firm may cause previ-
ously separate items to work together in a new manner.s9 Or, a 
firm may begin bundling items that had, in the past, been com-
bined downstream by purchasers.9° In either case, a straightfor-
ward application of the Jefferson Parish test would seem to 
mandate a finding that the bundled items are separate products. 
By hypothesis, after all, the items have always been sold sepa-
rately; moreover, other firms may not rapidly mimic the innova-
tion.91 Thus, it would seem, there will be a separate demand for 
bundled items and tying analysis must proceed. 
Despite the apparent result under the price-theoretic separate 
demand test, scholars have argued that courts should allow sellers 
to demonstrate directly that, in fact, an innovative combination 
actually lowers the costs of production or creates an improved 
product, and that consumers are not able to replicate these bene-
fits by combining the separate items themselves.92 If the innova-
tive bundle does create such benefits, there is only one product, 
and scrutiny should end.93 If not, then tying analysis should go 
forward and any claim that the bundle produces net benefits 
should be evaluated as an affirmative defense. And, indeed, some 
89 AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '!11746, at 224-25. 
9o !d. at 225-26. 
91 See id. at 224 ("By definition, new products are product bundles 
that others have not significantly marketed. Thus, they cannot be found a 
single product under the [separate demand] test."). 
92 See id. at 224-29; HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 368-69. 
93 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, '!11746, at 224-29; HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 41, at 368-69. See also Jack Walters, Inc., 737 F.2d at 703. 
Monopoly bundling : 93 
lower courts have employed just such a test, albeit before Jeffer-
son Parish announced the separate demand standard.94 
Of course, any test that allows sellers of innovative bundles to 
demonstrate directly the benefits of such arrangements will take 
cognizance of a broader range of efficiencies than can be captured 
under the separate demand test. In particular, such a test will cap-
ture-and treat as dispositive-efficiencies that a particular firm 
might realize ahead of or to the exclusion of others. Thus, the test 
will eliminate some of the disparate treatment produced by price 
theory's assumption that market participants generally face the 
same production function.95 Still, such an approach is not entirely 
divorced from price theory; for, like the separate demand test, the 
test will not identify posttransactional benefits. Instead, courts 
and scholars have limited their definition of cost savings to those 
realized through so-called technological tying, that is, efficiencies 
that a firm can generate by technologically uniting two or more 
items.96 Savings realized by uniting items contractually-that is, 
~4 See, e.g., Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 
F.2d 1307, 1330-31 (5th Cir. 1976) (declaring operating system and 
computer hardware a single product because "technological factor tying 
the hardware to the software" was designed "to achieve [a] technologi-
cally beneficial result") (alternate holding); Telex Corp. v. IBM, 367 F. 
Supp. 258, 347 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 894 
(10th Cir. 1975); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 448 F. 
Supp. 228, 230-32 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (finding combination of PC drive 
unit and head/disk assembly a single product because, inter alia, combi-
nation eliminated need for an automatic loading mechanism and thus 
lowered the cost per megabyte of storage capacity); but compare id. at 
232-33 (relying also upon fact that combination was consistent with 
industry practice). See also Foremost Pro Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., 703 F.2d 534, 541-43 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding that Kodak's release 
of new film that could only be developed using Kodak chemicals and 
paper was not a "tie" because no coercion was present). 
~s Cf. notes 67-68, supra and accompanying text (describing price 
theory's assumption that firms generally possess the same production 
function). 
46 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1746, at 225-27; HoVENKAMP, 
supra note 41, at 368-69 ("Any demonstrated cost reduction that results 
from the way an arrangement of items is manufactured or sold should 
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using contract to limit the discretion of purchasers-are not rec-
ognized under this approach.97 Indeed, as noted earlier, one lead-
ing treatise states that, in determining whether an innovative 
bundle produces efficiencies and should thus be deemed a single 
product, courts should ask whether purchasers could replicate the 
bundle and its benefits themselves.98 In so doing, this treatise 
ignores the question whether purchasers possess the information 
or incentive to make the proper choice.99 As a result, so long as 
create an inference that the combination is a single product. Such 'tie ins' 
should generally be legal, even if the seller is a monopolist.") (emphasis 
added). Despite the qualifying language ("generally"), Professor Hov-
enkamp does not explain when such ties should be unlawful. 
97 In re Data General Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. 
Cal.), provides a prime example of the disparate treatment of technologi-
cal and contractual efficiencies in this context. There the defendant 
required customers who purchased its operating systems also to purchase 
its central processing units (CPUs), even though its OS would function 
on other CPUs. The defendant claimed that its operating system and CPU 
were a single product, invoking posttransactional efficiencies. For 
instance, the defendant asserted that the OS "will not function reliably 
when used with foreign CPUs and [that] it is extremely difficult to ser-
vice [defendant's] software when used with foreign CPUs." !d. at 1106. 
While the court agreed that "these considerations are relevant to the ulti-
mate determination of whether the tie-in is unlawful," it held that such 
considerations were properly taken "into account as affirmative, business 
justification defenses rather than [by] folding them into the separate 
products issue." !d. 
98 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 111746, at 227. 
99 For instance, this treatise concludes that International Salt's bun-
dle of its salt dispensing machine and salt did not constitute an innova-
tive, single product, "even if defendant's machine worked better with his 
salt" because "the customer was no less able to put the items together 
than the defendant." !d. 111746, at 227 (emphasis added); see Interna-
tional Salt Co., 332 U.S. at 397-98 (rejecting assertion that tie of salt to 
salt dispensing machine was necessary to protect goodwill associated 
with machine). In so doing, the treatise does not address whether Interna-
tional Salt's customers would have the information and incentive neces-
sary to employ the appropriate sort of salt. This approach, of course, 
replicates that taken by courts hostile to affirmative defenses. See East-
man Kodak, 504 U.S. at 483-84 (asserting that tying is not necessary to 
protect a seller's goodwill where other vendors "could" produce substi-
Monopoly bundling 95 
items are technologically separate, they constitute separate prod-
ucts, and are subjected to the hostility of the per se rule, even if 
uniting them contractually produces posttransactional efficien-
cies.Joo Thus, while the test proposed for innovative bundles dis-
cards one price-theoretic assumption-universal production 
functions-it retains price theory's hostility toward posttransac-
tional efficiencies. Some consistency is achieved, as the generous 
attitude toward universal efficiencies is extended to some benefits 
realized by particular firms. This extension is limited, however, 
reaching only those bundles that are innovations, and only those 
innovations that bring technological benefits. 
tutes for tied item of sufficient quality); Chicken Delight, 448 F.2d at 
51-52 (finding that less restrictive alternatives would further franchisor's 
interest where other manufacturers "could" produce substitutes for the 
tied product). Cf Meese, supra note 29, at 75-81 (showing that pur-
chasers may not purchase appropriate tied item even if vendors are will-
ing and able to provide it). 
1oo To be sure, these scholars purport to distinguish between reduc-
tions in production costs and reductions in transaction costs, treating each 
as cognizable efficiencies that can justify a finding that two items are in 
fact a single product. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1741, at 182; 
HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 367 (same). However, it is clear that, in 
employing the phrase "transaction costs," these authors are referring not 
to posttransaction costs, such as opportunism, but instead pretransaction 
costs, such as sales expenses. See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 
1]1741, at 182; HoVENKAMP, supra note 41, at 369 (referring to "cost 
reductions" derived from the way in which items are "manufactured or 
sold"). These pre transaction costs, of course, are the sort of technological 
efficiencies traditionally recognized by the price-theoretic paradigm. 
Compare Carl Dahlman, The Problem of Externality, 22 J.L. & EcoN. 
141. 144-47 (1979) (distinguishing between various definitions of trans-
action costs). 
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IV. Innovative bundles in cyberspace: toward 
a rule of reason standard 
A. Two cheers for consistency: the D.C. Circuit's generous 
treatment of innovative bundles 
Litigation over the application of the 1994 consent decree to 
Microsoft's Windows 95/IE bundle highlighted the shortcomings 
of both the separate demand test and technological tying doctrine. 
It seems clear under the separate demand test that Windows 95 
and IE 3.0 and 4.0 were distinct products and thus not properly 
treated as integrated within the meaning of the 1994 decree.IOI 
There was apparently a separate demand for Internet browsers. 
Microsoft itself once sold browsers and operating systems sepa-
rately, and other makers of operating systems continue to do the 
same.1o2 Under Jefferson Parish and subsequent case law, it seems 
IOI Assuming, of course, that tying law supplied the meaning of "inte-
grated." See note 23, supra and accompanying text (describing D.C. Cir-
cuit's reliance upon tying law for its conclusion that the two items were 
integrated and thus outside the terms of the decree). 
102 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 940-41; Plaintiffs' Response to 
Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 45-46, 56 (arguing that 
other OS makers offer OEMs a choice of browsers). Microsoft apparently 
does not dispute this, instead arguing that no firm offers operating sys-
tems without also providing Web browsing functionality. See Microsoft's 
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 34-36. Even if all OS 
makers do require OEMs to purchase a browser, that does not preclude a 
finding of separate demand. No hospital, for instance, performs opera-
tions without anesthesia. Still, the Supreme Court found a separate 
demand for anesthesiologists because some hospitals, at least, allowed 
patients to choose their own anesthesiologist. See Jefferson Parish, 466 
U.S. at 22-23. 
The United States also makes much of the fact that Microsoft offers 
IE separately, on a stand-alone basis, directly to consumers. See, e.g., 
Plaintiffs' Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 
52-53. Such separate marketing, however, does not appear independently 
relevant. An automotive company may well market batteries, spark plugs, 
etc. separately, to consumers who have purchased cars elsewhere. Such 
separate marketing, however, would not suggest that, for instance, spark 
plugs and automobiles are separate products. 
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clear that separate sale of Windows 95 and Internet Explorer was 
efficient with the result that they were separate products. 103 
To be sure, Microsoft argued that the combination of Windows 
95 and its browser was an innovation, i.e., that certain OS 
functionalities were not available if a different browser was 
employed. 104 Thus, it continued, the two products were "inte-
grated" within the meaning of the decree, a result supported by 
technological tying doctrine. Yet, even if this doctrine survived 
Jefferson Parish, it did not save entirely Microsoft's bundle. 
While the Windows 95/IE 3.0 bundle was properly characterized 
as "technological," Microsoft provided Windows 95 and IE 4.0 on 
separate disks, and OEMs could have achieved the benefits of 
combining these two items just as readily as could Microsoft, by 
choosing to purchase IE and installing it. 105 Microsoft's contrac-
tual requirement to do so, it seems, added nothing to the func-
tional benefits of combining the two items. 
Despite these obstacles, the D.C. Circuit still suggested that 
both bundles were integrated products within the meaning of the 
decree. In light of the various anomalies that beset current doc-
trine, this is not surprising. No doubt the court realized that its 
opinion would be relevant outside the context of the consent 
decree and that a conclusion that the two items were not inte-
grated could subject similar software bundles to per se treatment 
and the accompanying hostility to any efficiency claims. More-
over, the facts before the court made it quite plain that bundle-
to3 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 19-21; Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 
462-63. Cf. PSI, Inc., 104 F.3d at 816-17 (concluding that circuit boards 
were not a single product because some firms sold component parts of 
such boards separately); Allen-Myland, Inc., 33 F.3d at 214. 
114 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950-51. See also Microsoft's Memo-
randum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 27-29 (describing various 
benefits purportedly created by bundle of Windows 98 and Internet 
Explorer). 
ws See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1746b, at 229 ("To find a new 
product, the items of software must operate better when bundled together 
by the seller than they would if they were distributed on different 
diskettes and installed by the buyer."). 
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generated efficiencies need not be universally realized to be real. 
The separate demand test, with its price-theoretic assumption of 
static, universal production functions seemed poorly suited to an 
industry where product upgrades are released on an annual basis. 
Still, while bolstering Microsoft's assertion that Windows 
95/IE 3.0 was an integrated product, rejection of the separate 
demand test did not by itself suggest that the Windows 95/IE 4.0 
bundle was similarly integrated, as consumers were capable of 
combining the two items themselves. Again, however, the facts 
before the court seemed to call into question the distinction 
between pre- and posttransactional efficiencies. The court could 
not believe that the result under the decree or tying doctrine must 
turn on "which firm's employees should run particular disks or 
CD-ROMs," that is, on whether the benefits in question were gen-
erated before or after the software left the boundaries of the 
firm. 106 As the court observed: "software code by its nature is sus-
ceptible to division and combination in a way that physical prod-
ucts are not."107 It was therefore feasible, the court said, to divide 
any particular software program into two aggregations of code, 
and to distribute each aggregation on separate disks. The mere 
fact that programs could be so bifurcated should not render what 
was otherwise one product two.I08 Concomitantly, the court said, 
the law should recognize those efficiencies that might result from 
uniting two items after they left the boundaries of the firm.Io9 
Thus, it concluded, an innovative bundle-even a bundle created 
by contract-should be considered a single product unless it 
produced no benefits or was created solely for anticompetitive 
purposes. 110 
106 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 951. 
107 See id. 
lOS /d. at 951-52. 
109 !d. at 950-52. 
tto !d. at 949 and n.12. See also Microsoft, 1998 Trade Cas. at 
82,674-75 (employing this test to determine whether Windows 98 and IE 
4.0 are separate products for tying purposes). 
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The D.C. Circuit's approach has the undoubted virtue of con-
sistency: nonuniversal benefits, including those that arise post-
transaction, are placed on an equal footing with those that would 
be captured by the separate demand test. Nevertheless, even under 
this approach, noninnovative bundles will still be subject to the 
per se rule whenever there is a separate demand for their compo-
nents.111 At any rate, uniformity does not by itself recommend the 
approach adopted by the court. After all, there is more than one 
uniform rule that could be applied to efficiency-creating bundles; 
one could, for instance, subject all bundles-even those univer-
sally adopted-to rule of reason scrutiny. The ultimate question 
posed by the unraveling of the separate demand test, then, is not 
whether efficiencies should be assessed under a uniform standard, 
but, instead, which uniform standard to adopt. The most logical 
candidates seem to be (1) extending the generous treatment 
accorded universal bundles to all beneficial bundles, or (2) sub-
jecting all bundles to traditional rule of reason scrutiny. Under the 
latter approach, proof that a bundle generates anticompetitive 
harm would establish prima facie illegality, shifting a burden of 
production to the proponent of the bundle.112 
Of course, this fundamental choice was not before the court in 
any practical sense. Given the decree's exception for integrated 
products as well as Supreme Court precedent, the D.C. Circuit 
was in no position to declare all bundles-even those universally 
adopted-subject to rule of reason scrutiny. Such a pronounce-
ment would have been tantamount to a repudiation of the require-
ment that two products be present before an unlawful tie can be 
found. Still, nothing compelled the court to extend the generous 
treatment accorded to universal bundles to those that, while bene-
ficial, were only adopted by some market participants. More pre-
cisely, the court could have subjected innovative bundles to closer 
scrutiny, leaving for another day-and another court-the ques-
tion how to treat universal bundles in a postprice theory world. 
III See notes 32-39, supra and accompanying text (describing vary-
ing standards lower courts apply to attempts to justify ties). 
m See, e.g., IX AREEDA, supra note 50, 11111728-29 (describing rule 
of reason as applied in tying context). 
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Still, because the D.C. Circuit was writing in the shadow of a 
per se rule hostile even to beneficial ties, one might argue, true 
rule of reason treatment was not an option, and the court's 
approach was appealing as a matter of second best, particularly in 
an environment in which a parallel Sherman Act suit was under-
way. In that litigation, it should be noted, the government has 
relied explicitly on the per se rule, despite its shaky economic 
foundations. 113 Thus, the D.C. Circuit's opinion can be seen as a 
return to those pre-Jefferson Parish decisions that circumvented 
the per se rule through manipulation of the single product test. 114 
Yet, the logic of the court's approach to the single product test 
cannot be limited to the per se context; it would apply even if ties 
were subjected only to rule of reason scrutiny.m Moreover, had 
the court looked beyond the precise issue before it, i.e., the mean-
113 See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunc-
tion, at 47. At one level, the government's reliance on the per se rule is 
unexceptional. The rule is, after all, "the law." Still, in other contexts, the 
government has refrained from enforcing the antitrust laws to the full 
extent allowed by extant case law, choosing to underenforce those prece-
dents no longer supported by sound economic theory. See William Bax-
ter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Common 
Law Nature of Antitrust, 60 TEX. L. REv. 661 (1982) Gustifying such a 
flexible approach); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust 
Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 705, 711 (1982) (noting that, during the Carter 
administration, the antitrust division "refused to enforce the Robinson-
Patman Act at all and based [this] refusal on an economic approach that 
amounted to nothing more than a disagreement with the Congress that 
enacted the statute."). Cf. Meese, supra note 29, at 86-94 (arguing that 
advances in economic theory have undermined economic premises of the 
per se rule). Ironically, then, the government's stubborn adherence to the 
per se rule may well lead the D.C. Circuit to the other extreme, i.e., a 
finding that the Windows/IE bundle is a single product, despite a separate 
demand for the two items. 
114 Cf. Principe, 631 F.2d at 308-10; Dehydrating Process Co., 292 
F.2d at 655-57. 
115 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, ~ 1742a-d (concluding that 
determination that two items are a single product should also preclude 
tying analysis under rule of reason). See also Meese, supra note 29, at 
86-94 (arguing that tying contracts should be analyzed under the rule of 
reason). 
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ing of "integrated product" under the consent decree, it may have 
found the doctrinal tools necessary to construct something like a 
rule of reason test in substance if not in form. To be precise, the 
court could have rejected Microsoft's argument that the mere 
presence of plausible benefits established that the Windows 95/IE 
bundle was integrated within the meaning of the decree and 
instead adopted a more discriminating analysis along the lines of 
the rule of reason. 116 At the same time, the court could have sig-
naled that, under the Sherman Act, Microsoft would be free to 
justify any tie, even one purportedly deemed per se unlawfu1. 117 
To be sure, such an approach would have been controversial in 
light of the Supreme Court's hostility to business justification 
defenses.ns The approach the court actually took-finding an 
integrated product despite a separate demand for Internet 
browsers-was equally controversial.H9 
l1 6 Cf. Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 958-59 (Wald, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that court should determine whether a bundle is integrated by asking 
"whether the resulting product confers benefits on the consumer that jus-
tify a product's bridging of two formerly separate markets"). 
117 See, e.g., Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1348-51 (affirming jury's find-
ing that franchise tie was justified). Of course, adoption of a generous 
business justification defense would not entirely replicate a rule of reason 
analysis, as a plaintiff could still establish a prima facie case simply by 
showing a tie and market power. See Meese, supra note 29, at 12-21 
(showing that modern per se rule depends on presumption that ties 
obtained by a monopolist are "forced" on purchasers and that such forc-
ing produces anticompetitive effects); Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 
12-15 (explaining that purpose of per se rule is to identify instances in 
which ties are "forced" on purchasers). However, proof that the tie cre-
ates significant benefits will shift to the plaintiff the burden of establish-
ing that the tie's harms outweigh its benefits. See AREEDA ET AL., supra 
note 50, 11 I 760e2, f. Such proof is not possible absent actual evidence of 
anticompetitive effect. !d. Adoption of properly calibrated business justi-
fication defenses, then, would move tying a doctrine a long way toward a 
de facto rule of reason standard. 
llx See notes 32-39, supra and accompanying text. 
ll'• See Microsoft, I 998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,672-74 (taking issue with 
D.C. Circuit's rejection of the separate demand test). 
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B. Constructing a rule of reason test for innovative bundles 
It seems likely that the D.C. Circuit will get a second chance 
to address this question. Shortly before the D.C. Circuit issued its 
opinion, the government filed a Sherman Act suit, challenging not 
only the Windows 95/IE bundle, but also the release of Windows 
98, which Microsoft combined with IE 4.0. Unlike the Windo~s 
95/IE 4.0 bundle, which was accomplished by contract, the Win.: 
dows 98/IE combination was accomplished through software 
code. Indeed, Microsoft has claimed that the two items are so 
integrated that removal of the code that provides browser func-
tionality would "do serious violence to the operating system" as 
well. 120 Because this combination generates significant benefits, 
Microsoft continues, the Windows 98/IE bundle is properly 
deemed a single product.I2I 
In so arguing, of course, Microsoft is asking for treatment 
more lenient than the rule of reason. Such scrutiny, however, is 
the norm and not the exception in antitrust analysis; departure 
from this standard requires concrete justification.122 Of course, the 
single product test is itself more lenient than the rule of reason in 
those instances in which bundling is universal. Extending such 
leniency to cases in which bundling is not universal, however, 
itself requires justification; indeed, the absence of such a justifica-
tion may call the leniency of the single product test into question. 
Courts and scholars have offered various rationales for extend-
ing this deferential treatment to innovative bundles. In particular, 
it is said, rule of reason scrutiny for technological ties would be 
subject to a high risk of error and thus deter technological 
120 See Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, 
at 28 ("Internet Explorer technologies are even more deeply integrated 
into Windows 98 than they were in Windows 95."); id. at 32 ("[T]here is 
no distinct product called Internet Explorer that can be separated from 
Windows 98 without doing serious violence to the operating system."). 
121 See Microsoft's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, 
at 27-33. 
122 See Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics, 485 U.S. 
717, 723-24 (1988). 
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progress.m Judges, some courts and scholars have said, simply do 
not possess the requisite expertise to second-guess decisions 
involving product design. 124 The D.C. Circuit, of course, relied 
precisely upon this rationale in rejecting the separate demand 
test.I25 
This argument does not appear persuasive. The difficulties 
inherent in balancing can just as well support a quite different 
result, namely, liability upon any showing of significant anticom-
petitve effect. 126 Wisely, however, antitrust courts have generally 
avoided each of these extremes, often engaging in the very sort of 
balancing that some reject as beyond judicial competence. Where, 
for instance, a seller demonstrates that a vertical restraint pro-
duces procompetitive benefits, or a dealer shows that such a 
restraint works anticompetitive harm, courts do not end the 
inquiry. Instead, they balance benefits against the harms produced 
by the arrangement.m This is so, it should be noted, even though 
123 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950 n.13 ("[T]he limited competence 
of courts to evaluate high-tech product designs and the high cost of error 
should make them wary of second-guessing the claimed benefits of a par-
ticular design decision."); Foremost Pro Color, 703 F.2d at 543; 
Response of Carolina, Inc., 537 F.2d at 1330; Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. 
at 347; see also AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1746, at 226. 
124 Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 950-51, n.13; Response of Carolina, Inc., 
537 F.2d at 1330; Telex Corp., 367 F. Supp. at 347. See also AREEDA ET 
AL., supra note 50, 1]1746, at 226 ("[where innovations are involved] tri-
bunals could review such arguments as an efficiency defense, but they 
lack the technical expertise to judge product design. As a result, allowing 
tying inquiry to proceed is likely to result in errors that would deter 
socially desirable innovations and variations in product design."); Hov-
ENKAMP, supra note 41, at 369 ("No court could balance the social losses 
that a forced combination sale may impose against potential social 
gains."). 
12s See Microsoft, 147 F. 3d at 950-53. 
126 See, e.g., United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.IO (1972) 
(suggesting that per se prohibition is preferable to "rambling through the 
wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible approach"). 
m See, e.g., Continental T.V. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52-59 
(1977). 
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the benefits of such arrangements, such as the amelioration of 
opportunism or the enhancement of goodwill, are not subject to 
neat quantification and comparison with anticompetitive effects.l28 
Similarly, courts do not condemn a merger simply because it cre-
ates market power, or immunize it because it produces efficiencies. 
In short, the mere fact that a transaction or contract generates 
benefits and thus would have been adopted absent an expectation 
of market power does not ordinarily place it beyond antitrust 
scrutiny. 129 Instead, where such an arrangement produces market 
power, courts and the enforcement agencies balance the harm 
flowing from that power against any benefits produced by the 
transaction. 13° Indeed, the efficiencies ascribed to mergers or other 
contractual arrangements are often the very sort of (technological) 
benefits-reduction in production costs or creation of an improved 
product-that are ascribed to innovative bundles. 131 There is no 
12& See Oliver Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: 
Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. 
REv. 953, 993 n.135 (1979) (noting that "a rigorous demonstration" of 
the benefits produced by vertical restraints "is not apt to be feasible"). 
See also Meese, supra note 29, at 79-80 (showing that goodwill benefits 
of bundling can extend beyond bundled products to include any product 
bearing the seller's trademark). 
129 In Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 
441 U.S. 1 (1979), for instance, the Court relied, in part, on the fact that 
small performing rights societies offered the very sort of blanket license 
there under challenge. 441 U.S. at 22-25. While the fact that this mecha-
nism was acceptable to a "large part of the market" militated against per 
se illegality, it did not, in the Court's eyes anyway, militate toward per se 
legality. 
13o See, e.g., F.T.C. v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 
1222-23 (lith Cir. 1991); United States v. United Tote, Inc., 768 F. 
Supp. 1064, 1084-85 (D. Del. 1991). 
131 See, e.g., University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d at 1223 (evaluating 
claim that transaction would eliminate unnecessary duplication of 
productive assets and thus lower production costs); United Tote, 768 
F. Supp. at 1084-85 (scrutinizing and rejecting claim that merger was 
justified because it would lead to "improved product innovation efforts"); 
BMI, 441 U.S. at 16-25 (holding that blanket license agreement that 
"substantially lower[s] costs" essentially created a new product and was 
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apparent reason why courts are capable of balancing good and 
bad effects in one context but not the other. Indeed, where non-
innovative bundles are involved, courts freely evaluate business 
justifications, sometimes making difficult judgments about tech-
nological interoperability.J32 
Courts should not take a different approach simply because 
innovation is involved. Innovation can take several forms: some 
contractual and some technological. Indeed, contractual innova-
tions often involve the integration of functions naturally left to 
separate firms. 133 Antitrust courts, of course, routinely review 
such innovations, even though economists or firms themselves 
may not fully understand the purpose of the arrangement in ques-
tion.134 To be sure, the novelty of a contractual arrangement conn-
properly subject to rule of reason scrutiny). Cf. /LC Peripherals Leasing 
Corp., 448 F. Supp. at 230-32 (declaring combination of disk drive and 
head/disk assembly a single product because it produced "larger on-line 
storage capacity" than had previously been available and eliminated 
necessity of an automatic disk loader). 
m See, e.g., Mozart, 833 F.2d at 1348-51 (affirming jury verdict that 
tie was least restrictive means of realizing significant benefits); N.W. 
Controls v. Outboard Marine Corporation, 333 F. Supp. 493, 504-06 (D. 
Del. 1971); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 
559-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960, aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961) (finding 
that bundle of community antenna equipment was properly treated as a 
single product for a limited period, after which it was an unjustified tie)). 
See generally, AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1]1760d, at 367-69 (endors-
ing this level of scrutiny where sellers attempt to justify tie). 
m See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (reviewing 
NCAA's policy of concerted output decisions); BM/, 441 U.S. at passim 
(reviewing blanket license agreement whereby competitors set uniform 
royalty); Continental T.V., 433 U.S. at passim (reviewing agreement allo-
cating to the manufacturer control over territory in which dealer dis-
tributed its goods). Of course, the contracts at issue in NCAA, BMI and 
Continental T.V. were not innovations by the time they reached the 
Supreme Court. Presumably, however, the Court would have subjected 
each arrangement to rule of reason scrutiny even if they had been chal-
lenged immediately after they were adopted. 
D4 Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 
76 GEo. L.J. 305, 308 (1987) ("Often it takes a decade or more to deter-
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sels against per se condemnation, as such treatment will deprive 
society permanently of the benefits of the practice.135 Such uncer-
tainty, however, does not preclude scrutiny under the more forgiv-
ing rule of reason, even though, by its nature, such review 
involves second-guessing business judgments. If antitrust courts 
can second-guess technological efficiencies and contractual inno-
vations, it is not clear why they cannot scrutinize technological 
innovations. 
Indeed, in other contexts, courts engage in equally complex 
inquiries asking, for instance, whether drugs are designed reason-
ably.136 More to the point, courts sometimes determine whether 
software met general standards of merchantability. 137 Of course, 
the mere fact that the courts appropriately scrutinize business 
decisions in one context does not ipso facto establish that they 
should do so in another. 138 Market mechanisms that discipline 
mine what a business practice really does."); cf CoASE, supra note 59, at 
67 (noting that most business practices are, from the perspective of an 
economist, "ununderstandable"). 
135 HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 436 ("[T]he continuing case for a 
rule of reason [in the case of vertical restraints] rests on the premise that 
we need to know more before we can move to a more categorical rule, 
one way or the other."); Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 309 (noting that 
judicial condemnation of a practice can deprive society of its benefits 
indefinitely). See also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 
263 (1963) ("We need to know more than we do about the actual impact 
of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they [should be 
per se illegal]."). 
136 See, e.g., Castrignano v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 
781-83 (R.I. 1988); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 
415-16 (Colo. 1986). 
137 See, e.g., Neilson Business Equipment Ctr. v. Small V. Mon-
teleone, 524 A.2d 1172-76 (Del. 1987). See also Advent Systems LTD v. 
Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675-76 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that license 
of software was a "good" subject to merchantability provisions of the 
U.C.C.); NMP Corp. v. Parametric Technology Corp., 958 F. Supp. 1536, 
1541-42 (N.D. Okl. 1997) (same). 
138 See FRAI'K H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE EcoNOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 93-94 (1991). 
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sellers may be present in one class of cases but not in another, 
thus justifying disparate treatment.139 Theory suggests, however, 
that these mechanisms are more powerful in the sales than in the 
antitrust context. Most product manufacturers, after all, do not 
possess significant market power and even monopolists have 
incentives to design well-functioning products. Where, on the 
other hand, a plaintiff can establish that a bundle will create or 
augment market power, there is even more reason for judicial 
scrutiny than there is in the sales context.I40 
Those who would depart from rule of reason scrutiny for inno-
vative bundles, then, have not made a compelling case. To be 
sure, the collapse of the price-theoretic paradigm suggests that 
these bundles can produce significant benefits, even if the practice 
has not been adopted throughout the market. Still, the mere exis-
tence of such benefits should not immunize the arrangement in 
question. Instead, whether technological or contractual, it seems, 
innovative bundles should be analyzed under the rule of reason. 141 
13Y !d. at 94-97 (arguing that judicial deference to business judgments 
is justified by presence of market mechanisms that discipline conduct of 
corporate officers and directors). 
14° Cf. Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 306 (arguing that courts 
should scrutinize business decisions more carefully where firms allegedly 
"injure consumers, who cannot retaliate readily"). 
141 Some may perceive that the argument made here proves too much, 
i.e., may justify abandoning the separate product test altogether. It may 
be that the argument made here applies with equal force to the separate 
product test, at least to the extent that such a test focuses on the benefits 
of joint packaging. Preservation of tying law in its current form, how-
ever, should not be the summum bonum of antitrust policy. As the Court 
said in Jefferson Parish: 
Of course, the Sherman Act does not prohibit "tying"; it prohibits 
"contract[s] ... in restraint of trade." Thus, in a sense the ques-
tion whether this case involves "tying" is beside the point. The 
legality of petitioners' conduct depends on its competitive conse-
quences, not on whether it can be labeled "tying." If the competi-
tive consequences of this arrangement are not those to which the 
per se rule is addressed, then it should not be condemned irrespec-
tive of its label. 
Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21 n.34. 
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In fact, some might argue that rule of reason scrutiny will 
actually protect and enhance innovation. Where software competi-
tion is concerned, innovation is the name of the game, and such 
innovation requires the innovator to incur sunk costs. It is con-
ceivable, however, that a dominant firm could employ a bundling 
strategy to deprive rivals-or potential rivals-of access to a 
customer base necessary to support the sunk costs of innova-
tion.142 
Indeed, fear that Microsoft is engaged in something like the 
anticompetitive strategy just described led the United States and 
several states to challenge the (technological) Windows 98/IE 
bundle. Microsoft's grip on the OS market, it is argued, is driven 
in part by the network effects that characterize the design and use 
of operating system software.143 The value of any operating sys-
tem increases along with the number of consumers who employ 
that system, as a large user base will support a richer variety of 
complementary application software.144 Ordinarily, application 
software will only function with one particular operating system 
or "platform." As a result, writers of such applications must 
decide which platform to write for. Because the vast majority of 
PC users possess a Microsoft OS, most application firms have 
chosen to write software that is compatible with Windows. Other 
things being equal then, Windows is more attractive to consumers 
than other operating systems, as Windows will support a wider 
array of applications.145 Any potential challenger to Microsoft's 
large share of the OS market must be willing to incur the sunk 
142 Cf. Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclu-
sion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 
209, 224-26 (1986) (describing possible strategy whereby manufacturer 
deprives rivals of outlets through exclusive dealing contracts). 
143 See supra note 13, Declaration of DavidS. Sibley, 111111-17. 
144 See generally David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, A Guide 
to the Antitrust Economics of Networks, 10 ANTITRUST 36, 36 (Spring 
1996) (concluding that network effects can "arise indirectly ... when 
additional network users spur the demand for complementary products"). 
145 See Microsoft, 56 F.3d at 1452 (reproducing statement of Profes-
sor Kenneth Arrow to this effect). 
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costs necessary to provide a significantly superior product or, in 
the alternative, to enter at a scale sufficient to induce application 
writers to provide a meaningful array of software. 
Enter Java, a programming language developed by Sun 
Microsystems. Applications written in this language can run on 
more than one operating system, with the result that application 
writers need not confine their product to a single platform.146 So, 
for instance, software written in Java could run on both Windows 
and IBM's OS/2. In order for a Java application to function, how-
ever, it must be translated by software, coexisting with an operat-
ing system, known as a Java Virtual Machine (JVM).t47 Netscape, 
it is alleged, is the most important distributional channel for the 
JVM; an application written in the Java language will run on any 
personal computer that includes Netscape.148 By redesigning and 
bundling Internet Explorer with its OS, the government argues, 
Microsoft is attempting to drive Netscape from the market, thus 
making it more costly to distribute the JVM.149 This strategy, it is 
said, will deter application makers from writing applications for 
non-Windows environments, raising the cost of competitive OS 
entry, and thwarting innovation. Proof that such a strategy is 
occurring and will be successful should establish a prima facie 
146 See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,670; Sun Microsystems, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1301, 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1998) 
("JAVA technology comprises a standardized application programming 
environment that affords software developers the ability to create and 
distribute a single version of programming code which is capable of 
operating on many different, otherwise incompatible, system platforms 
and browsers."). 
1-17 See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,670; Sun Microsystems, 
999 F. Supp. at 1303 ("A specific interpreter or virtual machine is needed 
for each computer CPU on which the JAVA program is run."). 
1-1s See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,670. Moreover, it appears 
that Netscape itself is a platform to which some applications can be writ-
ten. /d. 
149 See id. at 82,671-72 (describing government's contention); Krat-
tenmaker & Salop, supra note 142, at 226 (arguing that distribution is 
best characterized as an input). 
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case under the rule of reason.1so Moreover, proof that the bundle 
in question produces some plausible benefits and thus would be a 
single product under the D.C. Circuit's test does not, as a logical 
matter, preclude the presence of such anticompetitive effects or 
suggest that the bundle is procompetitive on balance. 1s1 
Indeed, the very plasticity that the D.C. Circuit invoked sug-
gests that such a strategy would readily escape something less 
than rule of reason scrutiny. It is not particularly difficult, it 
seems, to design software applications in a way that creates bene-
fits of functioning with an operating system. 152 If this is so, an OS 
firm that wishes to disadvantage makers of a particular sort of 
application can simply redesign its own application, point to ben-
efits created by that redesign, and insure-through contract or 
technology-that OEMs or consumers purchase the application 
along with the OS. 
1so See Meese, supra note 38, at 145-46 (describing strategy whereby 
franchisor employs tying contracts that raise the prices of its competitors' 
inputs). This is not to say that a plaintiff could establish a prima facie 
case under such a theory simply by establishing that Microsoft's bundle 
would drive Netscape from the market. A plaintiff would also have to 
establish that alternate channels of JVM distribution are not sufficient to 
establish a sufficient base of users of applications written in Java. See 
Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 142, at 225-26 (concluding that strat-
egy of depriving competitors of distribution channels cannot be anticom-
petitive if alternate methods of distribution remain). Moreover, a plaintiff 
would also have to establish that predatory counter-strategies by 
Netscape and others would not thwart Microsoft's tactics. See id. at 
268-72. Such a strategy, for instance, could involve Netscape's purchase 
of alternative vehicles of exclusive distribution for its browser. See id. at 
268-69. Netscape's recently announced merger with America Online 
could be characterized as just such a strategy. 
151 Cf Meese, supra note 38, at 141-43 (showing that existence of 
benefits rebuts presumption that contract has been "forced" on pur-
chaser). 
152 See Microsoft, 147 F.3d at 961 ("It is difficult to imagine how 
Microsoft could not conjure up some technological advantage for any 
currently separate software product it wished to 'integrate' into the oper-
ating system.") (Wald, J., dissenting). 
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Of course, the mere fact that the government can make out a 
prima facie case against Microsoft does not settle the question 
whether a rule of reason test will encourage more innovation than 
it will deter. Defenders of the D.C. Circuit's test would be quick 
to point out that laying out a prima facie case does not by itself 
establish that a bundle is a net harm to society, and they would be 
correct. To begin with, courts may mistakenly conclude that the 
bundle will generate or protect market power. Moreover, even 
those bundles that do generate such power may be efficient on 
balance. Given these possibilities, as well as courts' traditional 
hostility to justifications of tying contracts, reasonable minds 
could certainly conclude that, despite the possibility of anticom-
petitive behavior outlined above, a rule of reason test for innova-
tive bundles could in the end fetter more innovation than it would 
encourage. 
The challenge for those seeking a first best antitrust policy, 
then, is to construct a rule of reason test that provides meaningful 
scrutiny without equating a prima facie case with per se illegality. 
That is, unlike current tying doctrine, which views attempts at 
justification with a jaundiced eye, a rule of reason for innovative 
bundles would have to allow sellers to adduce evidence that (1) 
the bundle does not, in fact, enhance a firm's market power and/or 
(2) the benefits of the bundle outweigh its costs. Thus, courts 
would have to abandon the presumption that a seller's possession 
of market power by itself establishes anticompetitive effects, as 
well as their propensity to rely on the presence of less restrictive, 
less effective alternatives.ts3 
To be sure, gathering the information necessary to conduct 
such a balance would be a difficult task, both for the parties and 
the finder of fact. Moreover, reasonable minds can certainly ques-
153 As suggested earlier, any such softening of the per se rule will 
face opposition from the United States. See note 113, supra. Indeed, the 
United States has explicitly argued that it need not prove anticompetitive 
effects in order to establish that the bundle is unlawful. See Plaintiffs' 
Joint Response to Microsoft's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 48 n.22 
("Because Microsoft's forced licensing of Internet Explorer is unlawful 
per se, anticompetitive effects are presumed."). 
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tion the competence of courts to compare the anticompetitive 
effects of a practice against its benefits. 154 Indeed, rule of reason 
balancing is notoriously generous to defendants.JSS Still, in some 
instances anyway, courts can structure rule of reason analysis so 
as to minimize the costs and maximize the accuracy of such an 
inquiry. For instance, where a bundle is purely contractual, courts 
can often forgo further inquiry, leaving the market to determine 
whether the bundle in question is reasonable. Of course, markets 
sometimes fail, and the point of many ties is to overcome such 
failures by contract.I56 Price theory, and the antitrust doctrine that 
it bred, fell short precisely because each failed to acknowledge 
the ability of nonstandard contracts to overcome market failure; 
the D.C. Circuit sought to remedy this shortcoming by recogniz-
ing the possibility of posttransactional benefits. 157 Still, once a 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, there is no reason to 
presume that the bundle under scrutiny is designed to overcome 
market failure. Instead, a seller that wishes to justify a contractual 
bundle on efficiency grounds should first demonstrate that, in 
fact, the market in question is prone to failure. More precisely, the 
proponent of the bundle must show that transaction costs, that is, 
the cost of relying upon the buyer to choose which complemen-
tary item to employ, characterize the relationship in question.1ss 
Such costs, of course, will include information costs and the pos-
sibility of opportunism, i.e., behavior that does not maximize the 
joint welfare of the parties. 159 Failing such an explanation, there is 
154 See Rothery Storage v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 229 n.11 
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) (arguing that there is no "useable formula" to 
"weigh procompetitive effects against anticompetitive effects"). 
155 See, e.g., HovENKAMP, supra note 41, at 431 ("The rule of reason 
has come close to creating complete non-liability for non-price 
restraints."). 
156 See Meese, supra note 29, at 59-66. 
157 See notes 106-10, supra, and accompanying text. 
158 See Meese, supra note 29, at 56-57, 61-66 (defining such costs 
and describing how they can be present in a buyer-seller relationship). 
159 Thus, in order to convince the court to balance procompetitive 
against anticompetitive effects, Microsoft would have to show that OEMs 
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no rationale for contractual restraint, and courts should not enter-
tain evidence that the bundle's benefits outweigh its costs. Instead, 
purchasers should be left to determine whether the bundle creates 
any net benefits, that is, whether, adjusting for price, the bundle is 
superior to the combination of the seller's product and a product 
sold by the seller's competitor. A court should not allow itself or a 
monopolist to substitute its judgment for the decentralized process 
of information production and dissemination that characterizes a 
well-functioning market. Where, on the other hand, the market in 
question is prone to failure, courts should engage in balancing.16o 
It would be tempting to take a similar approach, that is, to 
declare such a bundle unlawful whenever the market functions 
either cannot understand the benefits of the Windows 98/IE bundle, see 
Dehydrating Process Co., 292 F.2d at 656-57, or in the alternative, that 
they do not possess the requisite incentives to choose the most appropri-
ate combination of OS and browser. Cf. Meese, supra note 38, at 117-20 
(describing franchisee incentives to free ride). At first blush, it seems 
Microsoft will find it difficult to make a case that such market failure is 
present. Unlike customers in Dehydrating Process Co., for instance, 
OEMs are technically sophisticated and likely understand the interwork-
ings of various forms of software. Moreover, unlike franchisees, for 
instance, OEMs seem to possess incentives to maximize the goodwill 
associated with the product they distribute, namely, a package of equip-
ment and software. 
160 Such balancing should proceed even if unbundling would degrade 
or destroy one of the bundled items. Cf. Microsoft's Memorandum in 
Support of Summary Judgment, at 32 (arguing that Windows 98/IE bun-
dle is not a tie because "there is no distinct product called Internet 
Explorer that can be separated from Windows 98 without doing serious 
violence to the operating system"). The mere fact that undoing a particu-
lar combination will damage its constituent parts does not establish that 
the benefits of the bundle outweigh its anticompetitive effects. Moreover, 
Microsoft apparently concedes that, where two items have purposely 
been "bolted" together, they should be deemed separate products, even if 
"unbolting" will damage one or both of the items. See Microsoft's Mem-
orandum in Support of Summary Judgment, at 29; see also Microsoft, 
147 F.3d at 949. There is no reason why the outcome in this context 
should turn on the seller's intent or purpose. Even a well-intended bundle 
may be unreasonable. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 
u.s. 231, 238 (1918). 
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well, where the bundle in question is technological in nature. 
However, if the combination is truly technological, such a short 
cut would not be warranted. For, in such cases, the seller may 
claim that the technological nature of the combination itself pro-
duces the benefits in question, that is, that unbundling would 
change the nature of the product or service. 161 In such cases, 
courts will have no choice but to engage in more traditional bal-
ancing, comparing the benefits of the combination to the anticom-
petitive effects it creates.I62 
This is not to say that any technological combination that 
brings an improvement over prior combinations should lead courts 
to engage in balancing. The improvement must be produced by 
the technological integration, and not the result of coincidental 
advances unrelated to that combination. 163 Where, on the other 
hand, the very same improvements could be realized without tech-
nological combination, courts should apply the approach sug-
gested above for contractual bundles, asking whether any market 
failures preclude reliance upon purchasers' judgment. 164 Where 
161 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50,~ 1746b, at 227-28 (defining 
innovative bundle as combination that cannot, for technical reasons, be 
replicated by purchasers); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp., 448 F. Supp. 
at 232 (evaluating technological combination of drive unit and head/disk 
assembly that eliminated need for an automatic disk loading mechanism). 
Cf Data General, 490 F. Supp. at 1108-09 (finding CPUs and memory 
boards separate products where consumers removed defendant's board 
and installed boards manufactured by competitors). 
162 The distinction drawn here between technological and contractual 
ties may appear to mirror the (unjustified) distinction between the two 
drawn by technological tying doctrine. See notes 89-100, supra and 
accompanying text. This is not the case, however. What is proposed here 
is a uniform standard-rule of reason treatment-with differing methods 
of implementation. 
163 Cf Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Joint 
Merger Guidelines, § 4.0 (only merger-specific efficiencies are cogniz-
able to justify otherwise anticompetitive transaction). 
164 Indeed, the plasticity on which the D.C. Circuit relied suggests 
that many apparently technological bundles are best characterized as con-
tractual, i.e., that software can be unbundled without eliminating the ben-
efits of integration. 
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no such failure is present, courts should deem technological 
unbundling a less-restrictive alternative, and declare the bundle 
unlawful. 
In conducting this analysis, courts must take care to distin-
guish a contractual bundle from a truly technological bundle sup-
ported by ancillary contractual restraints. Thus, the fact that 
Microsoft has prohibited OEMs from depriving consumers of 
ready access to browser functionality does not transform an other-
wise technological tie into a contractual one.'65 At first glance, the 
presence of such a restriction would suggest that the underlying 
bundle is contractual and should be analyzed as such. Absent a 
market failure, after all, consumers are just as competent to decide 
whether to unbundle as to bundle in the first place. In the present 
case, however, the presence of this contractual restriction does not 
preclude the possibility that the Windows 98/IE bundle is truly 
technological in nature. According to Microsoft, anyway, actual 
removal of the software code that provides browser functionality 
will "degrade" the underlying operating system. 166 As a result, 
because no OEM actually desires to injure the operating system, 
the contracts in question merely prevent OEMs from interfering 
with customers' access to the browser, by, for instance, hiding the 
icon. Such interference, it should be noted, apparently does not 
impair the underlying software code and thus does not deprive the 
ultimate consumer of many of the purported benefits of technolog-
ical integration.167 Thus, while themselves subject to rule of reason 
scrutiny as nonprice vertical restraints, the existence of such agree-
ments does not preclude the possibility that the technological com-
bination of Windows 98 and IE produces significant benefits. 168 
165 See Microsoft, 1998-2 Trade Cas. at 82,673-74 (distinguishing 
technological tying cases on the grounds that Microsoft "took the further 
step of contractually prohibiting OEMs from unbundling") (emphasis 
supplied). 
IM See note 120, supra. 
167 See note 8, supra. 
16h If the government can establish a prima facie case that such agree-
ments are anticompetitive, Microsoft will be required to adduce evidence 
of procompetitive benefits. Here again, it seems proof that some market 
116 The antitrust bulletin 
V. Conclusion 
Antitrust should strive to distinguish beneficial arrangements 
from those that do harm. A product of the applied price theory tra-
dition, tying doctrine does not perform this task well. Bundles 
that do not generate benefits for all market participants are treated 
as distinct products, and the mere existence of market power, 
without more, establishes that a combination of two products is 
unlawful per se. While some lower courts have allowed sellers to 
justify per se unlawful ties, the standards employed to evaluate 
such justifications are unduly onerous, and tying law treats differ-
ent efficiencies quite differently. Those realized universally will 
place a bundle beyond scrutiny, while others will likely not be 
recognized at all. 
The D.C. Circuit's Microsoft opinion can be viewed as an 
attempt to mitigate the harsh consequences of tying doctrine's dis-
parate treatment of various sorts of efficiencies. By creating an 
exception to the separate demand test for innovative bundles, the 
court recognized that efficiencies need not be realized universally 
to be real. Moreover, by entertaining proof of benefits not deemed 
technological, the court recognized the existence of posttransac-
tional benefits, so long slighted by the price-theoretic paradigm. 
Still, the collapse of the price-theoretic paradigm did not itself 
justify the standard announced by the D.C. Circuit. For, there is 
another uniform standard the court could have applied: rule of 
reason treatment. Unlike the D.C. Circuit's test, which would 
immunize any bundle that produces significant benefits, such an 
approach would balance such benefits against any anticompetitive 
harms generated by the bundle. If applied in a rigorous manner, 
such a test may actually encourage innovation. 
failure prevents OEMs from, for instance, choosing to display the appro-
priate icon would be necessary. 
